7TH ANNUAL ITWEB

SECURITY SUMMIT

REINVENTING INFORMATION SECURITY

WHERE TRUSTED TECHNOLOGIES HAVE FAILED YOU

HTML5 Unbound: A Security & Privacy Drama

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Qualys

A Drama in Four Parts

- The Meaning & Mythology of HTML5
- Security From Design
- Security (and Privacy) From HTML5
- Design, Doom & Destiny

"This specification defines the 5th major revision of the core language of the World Wide Web: the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). In this version, new features are introduced to help Web authors, new elements are introduced based on into prevailing authoring practices. attention has been given to defining conformance criteria for user agents in an effort to improve interoperability."

Is my ~~Geocities~~ site secure?

The Path to HTML5

3350 B.C.	Cuneiform enables stone markup languages.
July 1984	“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination...” *Neuromancer,* p. 0x33.
Dec 1990	CERN httpd starts serving HTML.
Nov 1995	HTML 2.0 standardized in RFC 1866.
Dec 1999	HTML 4.01 finalized.

HTML5. Meaning vs. Mythology

<!doctype html>

Cross Origin Resource Sharing

WebSocket API

Web Storage

Web Workers

Social [_____]

[_____] as a Service

Web 2.0++

Flash, Silverlight

CSRF

Clickjacking

“Default Secure” Takes Time



“Default Insecure” Is Enduring

Dec 2005

Securing your Rails application |

1.2 The solution

Active Record provides two ways of securing sensitive attributes from being overwritten by malicious users that change the form. The first is attr_protected that denies mass-assignment the right to change the named parameters.

Using attr_protected, we can secure the User models like this:

```
class User < ActiveRecord::Base
  attr_protected :approved, :role
end
```

This will ensure that on doing `User.create(@params['user'])` both `@params['user']['approved']` and `@params['user']['role']` will be ignored. You'll have to manually set them like this:

```
user = User.new(@params['user'])
user.approved = sanitize_properly(@params['user']['approved'])
user. role    = sanitize_properly(@params['user']['role'])
```

Public Key Security Vulnerability and Mitigation

Whitelist all attribute assignment by default. · 06a3a8a · rails/rails

railties/lib/rails/generators/rails/app/templates/config/application.rb

```
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ class Application < Rails::Application
    # This will create an empty whitelist of attributes available for mass-assignment
    # in your app. As such, your models will need to explicitly whitelist or blacklis
    # parameters by using an attr_accessible or attr_protected declaration.
-   # config.active_record.whitelist_attributes = true
+   config.active_record.whitelist_attributes = true

<% unless options.skip_sprockets? -%>
    # Enable the asset pipeline
```

Mar 2012

“Developer Insecure” Is Eternal

- Advanced Persistent Ignorance



JavaScript: Client(?!) Code

- The global scope of superglobals
- The prototypes of mass assignment
- The eval() of SQL injection
- The best way to create powerful browser apps
- The main accomplice to HTML5

History of Web Designs

- Cookies
  - Implementation by fiat, not by standard
  - A path of ornamentation, not origin
  - HTTP/HTTPS, JavaScript/non-JavaScript
- Same Origin Policy
  - Access everything, read some things
  - No privilege or all privilege, not least privilege
- User Agent sniffing
- HTTPS
  - Not the default
  - Relies on DNS

The Dramatic Journey to HTML5

- (WAP, WML)
- (XHTML)
- CSRF
- Clickjacking
- <video>
- WebGL
- WebSocket API

Mixing Markup & Methods

HTML2 (1995)



HTML4 (1998)

```
<img
src="javascript:errurl='http://
site/users/anon/hotmail/
getmsg.htm';nomenulinks=top.subme
nu.document.links.length;for(i=0;
i<nome
{top.s                                    i].ta
rget='
top.su                                    ].hre
f=erru
nowork                                    t.lin
ks.len
for(i=
{top.w                                    targe
t='wor
top.wo                                    ref=e
rrurl;
```



HTML5 Injection

- Legacy and “non-standard” modes won’t disappear
- Look at this from the historical perspective of design and implementation
- Section 8.2 unifies parsing HTML
- Same old same origin

```
<div id=mycode style="BACKGROUND: url('java
script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)')"
expr="..."></div>
```

HTML5 Form Validation




```
<input pattern="[A-Z]+" name="alpha_only"...

<input ... autofocus onfocus="...
```

"Yes, you can re-add that logic server-side, but why would you want to add that kind of logic twice." -- illustrative mailing list comment from 2011

Defense from Design

- Sandboxing iframes, form submission, javascript execution
  - Improving granularity of Same Origin Policy
- Cross Origin Resource Sharing
  - Better than JSONP
- Content Security Policy
  - Monitor/enforce eases adoption

The Other HTML5

- Web Storage API
  - Transparent resource
  - Privacy extraction, not SQL injection

- WebSocket API
  - Another vector for launching DoS attacks from the browser
  - Does not confer authentication & authorization to a protocol layered over WebSockets
  - A chance to reinvent protocol vulnerabilities

Reinventing Protocol Vulns

- Prefixed strings
- Identification
- Authorization
- Information leakage
- Replay
- Spoofing
- eval()

More Processing in the Browser

- Same Origin Policy still a coarse-grained control
- Bring HTML5 to HTML4
  - Emulate IndexedDB, etc.
- Leveraging JavaScript's global scope
- DOM-based XSS
- evals, xhrs
- More work for blacklists and filters

Improving Browsers

- Process separation
- Sandboxed plugins
- Bug bounties
- X-Frame-Options
- XSS Auditors
- HTML5 should be the only version number you need



Never Mind the IDN, Here's the...

Mobile: What Design?

- User expectations
  - Who cares about the URL anymore? It's hardly even visible.
- Embedded browser-like features are not embedded browsers
  - Same Origin Policy enforcement
  - Certification verification
- User tracking

Privacy: 1 Billion Reasons To Care

- Geolocation
- Supercookies
- Do-Not-Track
- HSTS



Threats, Troubles, Trends

- Frames
  - Sharing, nesting, moving between Origins
- Plugins
  - Outside of sandbox, outside of HTML5
  - Worse security than browsers
- More specs
  - Hardware access, monitoring
- Passwords
  - Plaintext from browser to server, encrypted on server
  - OAuth & OpenID?

JavaScript Libraries

- Ext JS 1.1.1 to 4.0.7
- jQuery 1.0.2 to 1.2.5
- Modernizer 1.1 to 2.5.3
- MooTools 1.1 to 1.4.5
- Prototype 1.3.0 to 1.7.0
- YAHOO 2.2.0 to 2.9.0
- YUI 3.0.0 to 3.4.1

Recognizing Positive Security

- Acknowledges threats intended to counter, and those it doesn't
- Encrypted transport
- Adherence to Same Origin
- Preflight checks for authorization
- Authentication & authorization grants have short lifetimes
- Requires least privilege, least data
- Parsing failures fail, not fix up

HTML5 Is Good For You

- Beware of legacy support for and within old browsers
- Abolish plugins
- Deploy headers: X-Frame-Options, HSTS, CSP
- Data security is better



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iWeb events

Questions?

Thank You!

http://deadliestwebattacks.com/