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Capitalizing on Collective Intelligence

Building and Breaking Privacy Barriers

SESSION ID: CDS-W07

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Agents: User, Double, Secret

Browsers are placing more components and content in sandboxes. This **resource isolation** creates a more secure environment by default.



But privacy also requires data isolation.





The Great Barrier Grief

The Browser — A delicate ecosystem for rendering an abundance of sites, under pressure from aggregating innumerable origins, threatened by hazardous content and encroaching datavores.





Browser Security (My system)

Automatic self-update assures prompt patching.

Process separation inhibits exploits.

SSL/TLS prioritizes recommended protocols and ciphers.



(Myself) Data Security

Some In-Browser Barriers

Security

Same Origin Policy

Cookie Policies

HTML5 Sandboxes

Content Security Policy

Plugins

Privacy

P3P 🛞

Cookie Policies

Do Not Track 😕






Same Origin Is Only Some Isolation

CSRF [Forge]

	e o o web.site	H _N				
	+ 🔄 https 🖨 web.site/HWA/ch3/changeP. C Reader	>>				
	Change your password.					
	New Password:					
	Confirm Password:					
	Submit					
7						
O O Deadl	iest Web Attackss into web security.					
1	webattacks.com C Reader >>					
Deadliest Web Attacks						
Entert	aining insights into web security.					
	Menu					
3-4	16 1 7 105 4					
OUALYS'						

Clickjacking [Overlay]



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The Parallax of Privacy

These examples focus on **technical controls**, e.g. a trusted client running untrusted code.

Effective enforcement may also require policy, legal, or social controls.





Desirable Attributes

Durational Relevance — Works against immediate and long-term attacks.

Internal Isolation — Minimal data exposure to authorized users, i.e. least privilege access.

Disassociation (External Isolation) — Minimal correlative potential with other data sets.

Security Failures Impact Privacy

- Absence of transport security exposes data to sniffing and intermediation. Inadequacy of state enforcement enables browser activity within a user's context.
- **Confusion** of interface layering misleads user activity within a security context.





Feature Abuse Impacts Privacy

Java LiveConnect

new Socket(host, port).getLocalAddress().getHostAddress();

WebRTC

var RTCPeerConnection = window.webkitRTCPeerConnection ||
window.mozRTCPeerConnection;

* beef/modules/host/get_internal_ip beef/modules/host/get_internal_ip_webrtc

Browser

System

Screenshots with <canvas> (limited)

* http://html2canvas.hertzen.com

Fingerprinting with <canvas>

User

Mouse tracking exfiltration via WebSockets



[Example] CSP

Positive security model to control resource origins and JavaScript execution.

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'
<pre> <input name="q" type="text" value=""/><script>alert(9)</script>"></pre>
Search
Refused to execute inline script because it violates the following <u>xss.php:8</u> Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'".
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[Example] CORS

Positive security model to control read access to resources in mixed-origin content.


Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://web.site Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET Access-Control-Max-Age: 10



[Example] HSTS

Instruct the client to force https schemes for the origin and terminate https connections that are in error or produce warnings.

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=2592000




Site, Origin, Resource, ...

We've isolated resources and execution with CSP, used CORS to broaden resource access for explicit origins and duration, and used HSTS to isolate origins with encrypted traffic.

But have we improved data isolation?



Constellations of Isolation




"—it's full of stars!"






Resource Isolation, Data De-Isolation



Resource Isolation, Data De-Isolation






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
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Resource Isolation, Data De-Isolation









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Stellar Collapse

One mistake where a tracking cookie ties two isolated profiles back together.

Correlation with other data sets may deanonymize profiles.

In a world with one eye on privacy, the blind browser is king.



[Review] Same Origin Policy

Restricts read access to a resource, doesn't restrict "simple" requests for a resource (e.g. web beacons, CSRF).

Mixed origin content can be secure and still be a threat to privacy.





Consider Cookie Policies

Ambiguous relationships between firstand third-party status. [Inadequacy]

First-party status implies recency, not permanency. [Durational Relevance]

Merely one manner of tracking.



Learning from Weaknesses

Timing inference that reveals data based on caches, algorithms, etc.

Data leaks due to incomplete controls.

Side-channel attacks against missing controls.





Passwords as Private Data

Sharing a secret between two parties.

singapore

Means they must protect the secret.

b599de2309e31a21e41394d1614051bb4be8e2ba

Typically over a long period of time.

9b55f92f710a65aa60ac2d50fa73188831b6e77f





Private and Non-Persistent

Secure Remote Password enables parties to share knowledge of a secret, without revealing the secret to the server. ...now equate credit cards as one-time shared secrets for a purchase.

...then generalize this to a search problem where terms are not revealed.



Privacy Grabs, e.g. OAuth

User exchanges data, such as contacts.

User authorizes **impersonation**, such as posting messages.

Provider achieves **centralization** of a user's activity.



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
Durational Relevance-HTTPS

Immediate positive effect against intermediation.

Impermanent effectiveness against sniffing and brute force.

Captured traffic persists.

Cipher choice exposes captured traffic to compromised secret key.



* https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/

Ciphers and Secrets

G G Follow SSL Stream (tcp.stream eq 0)	
GET /HMA/Sslls/ HTTP/1.1 Host: web.site	
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 00:13:28 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.27 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.27 OpenS5L/1.0.1h DAV/2 PHP/5.3.28 Last-Modified: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 23:08:18 GMT ETag: "2a29c65-bf-4fdf3044edc80" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 191 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8	😝 🔿 👩 🖉 Follow SSL Stream (tcp.stream eq 1)
html <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"/> <title>Deadliest Web Attacks</title> </head> <body> Check out this web site. </body> </html>	0 client pkts, 0 server pkts, 0 turns. Entire conversation (0 bytes) \$ Show data as ASCI Find: Find Next Help Hide this stream Print Save as Close
I client pkt, I server pkt, I turn. Entire conversation (533 bytes) : Show data as ASCII :	
Find: Find Next	DHE-DSS-AES256-SH/
Help Hide this stream Print Save as Close	
RC4-SHA	
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Transport vs. Content Privacy

Browser-based email apps that attempt encryption run **unsigned code** to read

signed emails.



Mobile apps have stronger sandboxes in terms of data isolation.





Encryption Isn't Perfect Privacy

- Coarse fingerprinting of browsers' default protocol/cipher choices.
- Remains difficult to implement securely, e.g. BEAST, CRIME, Heartbleed, ...
- Does not impede traffic analysis of metadata.





[Example] Bitcoin Blockchain

Transactions are anonymous, but not private; all are exposed and remembered by design.

Wallets can be identified, parties in transactions narrowed down.

* http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/files/imc13.pdf



Mobile Device, Mobile Data

Some apps rediscovered basic security failures in misuse of HTTPS and plaintext storage on device.

Even so, app sandboxes have stronger data isolation than browsers.

Consequently, apps make more explicit data grabs.





User Agent for the Users

Establish a default strong privacy stance that echoes default security.

Expose cryptographic schemes to improve password and identity management.

Improve data isolation with "Context Vaults" and tab separation.





Persistence of Vision



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Cloistered Browsing / Context Vaults





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Protecting Data By Polluting It

"Two methods (other than recourse to ideal systems) suggest themselves for frustrating a statistical analysis. These we may call the methods of *diffusion* and *confusion*."

- Claude Shannon, *"Communication*

Theory of Secrecy Systems". 1949.



Diffusion

Actively pollute cookie* values in order to reduce the correlation of the tracked identity associated with it.

Pool and randomly distribute tracking values instead of (in addition to) forcing expiration.

_x X1.2.815605246.1289949686.web.site / expiration

*...and beacon, pixel, etc.





Confusion

Avoid tracking bugs in the first place.

Use canaries in anonymous, pre-auth situations, e.g. iOS 8 Wi-Fi probes and randomized MAC addresses.



Use Your Illusion

A Tor network obfuscates identity tied to an IP address.

Create a "Rot" network that obfuscates identity tied to tracking data (via pooling, pollution).

Browsers join a Crowd as a Service model in order to distribute tracked identities.

Some Parting Privacy Points

Personas - Independent collections of data

- Protection Default settings increase privacy, opt-in to data exposure
- Penalties Effects for willful or malicious bypass of a protection
- Persistence Settings and policies remain in effect, changes are highlighted and transparent
- Pollution Active countermeasures against tracking





Summary

The encouragement of default secure has yet to reach default private.

Client-side data isolation needs complementary server-side controls that allow data to decay.

Establish technical controls that supplement legal and policy decisions.





Thank You!

Slides at http://deadliestwebattacks.com

Questions @CodexWebSecurum

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